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16 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Interagency Coordination of Intelligence Activities

REFERENCE: The Inspector General's Memorandum dated 26 May 1953

I. Fundamental Tenets Suggested by Referenced Memo

1. I agree with Kirk that the DCI might be subject to criticism from the Congress for a failure to meet certain responsibilities in coordination (not "exercise this authority"). The DCI's responsibility in coordination is to make recommendations to the NSC and, when directed by the NSC, to coordinate.

2. With respect to the responsibility to recommend to the NSC, I am sure that to date the Director's staffs (including OIC, of course) have not done a complete job. For example, it may be that his staff should have urged him to take up with the IAC and recommend to the NSC quite some time ago the matter of coordination of departmental budgets. I would hope this failure to date has emanated from good judgment as to timing rather than dereliction of duty.

3. With respect to those areas where the DCI has been directed to coordinate, he has not been completely successful (e. g., NSCIDs 1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 6, 7 and 8 in part); this is largely because we have not all been as imaginative, as precise or as expeditious in our thinking as we would hope one day to be.

4. On both these points, if I had to answer the Congress with regard to criticism such as Kirk has outlined, I would (a) want to make sure that they first understood the nature of the federal

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intelligence system and then (b) refer them to NSC-135/2 (the most recent edition of the Progress Report on Intelligence Activities relating to national security programs, originally NSC-68). It is within the framework of points (a) and (b) that we hold our stewardship to the President.

5. Budget slashes have moved us precipitously into the question of responsibility for the preservation of the system and is forcing us to evaluate whether or not threatened parts of the system are really integral. It seems to us that, despite a checkered history, the Law, the NSCID's and the practices of former DCI General Smith, have all recognized the evolutionary character of the system and that, in the main, this evolution should be carried forward in concert with the other agencies. It would thus appear as important for CIA, in undertaking a new project or in answering the question of how is an existing project doing, first to consult with the other IAC agencies as it is that they should consult with CIA in this regard. (This is not to say that in the last analysis either the DCI or the other chiefs are forbidden to move on their own initiative within their own responsibilities, nor when in disagreement they cannot proceed independently).

6. It would seem that the Law and the NSCID's in practice have laid great emphasis on the "what" and our failure has been to a large extent in the "how."

7. For the Director to exercise "supervisory" responsibility under our system requires great imagination to find methods and techniques somewhat different from those normally attributed to supervision. The extent to which the Department of State, for example, has consulted the Agency since October 1950 suggests what is possible. Today we are privy to or can easily obtain from State most of what Kirk suggests the Director would need. It is true that this case is easier than we would find in the military, and there are reasons for this fact. It is my hunch that the trend of our evolution and the impact of the present Administration's budget will hasten the same trend with regard to military intelligence activities vis-a-vis CIA. Under threats from various quarters, those agencies will, even as the Department of State's

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intelligence, turn more and more to CIA to find mutual solutions. Such a trend will also be hastened by the DCI's attitude of a sense of responsibility for the system and its component parts, and by his effort to solve the problem in the interests of all and particularly in furtherance of a solid base for national security.

II. Conclusions

1. That in meeting the problem of Kirk's paper the tenets above should apply.

2. That such staff as Kirk proposes should (a) also encompass planning and coordination and (b) either be OIC as modified or reconstituted, or OIC should be abolished. What it is currently doing should be done by the new group or assigned elsewhere. To retain both would be duplication and if they operated from different philosophies would likely be damaging rather than helpful.

JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

OIC:JQR:KR (16 June 1953)

cc - Mr. Guthe

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